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 [This article analyses case law relating to the red hand rule. In 
particular, there is an examination of the decision of the High Court 
in Toll v Alphapharm Pty Ltd. The judgment of the court signals a 
clear answer as to whether the red hand rule applies to signed 
documents. In this context, the authors also consider whether section 
52 of the Trade Practices Act, and statutory provisions relating to 
unconscionability, are available to protect consumers against unusual 
or unreasonable clauses incorporated into signed contracts. Two 
recent cases involving share trader David Tweed are also analysed.] 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
It is trite law that a party attempting to exclude or limit legal liability, by 
incorporating an exemption clause into an unsigned contract, must take 
reasonably sufficient steps (at or before the time of contracting) to give notice 
of the clause to the other party.1 The more unreasonable or unusual the clause, 
the greater the insistence by some judges that the clause be drawn to the 
attention of the other party in an explicit way, such as being printed in red ink 
with a red hand pointing to it. The genesis of the so-called red hand rule is to 
be found in Spurling v Bradshaw Ltd,2 where Lord Denning said: 
 
[T]he more unreasonable a clause is, the greater the notice which must be 
given of it. Some clauses would need to be printed in red ink with a red hand 
pointing to it before the notice could be held to be sufficient.3 
 
 
                                                 
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Business and Enterprise, Swinburne University of 
Technology. 
**Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Business and Enterprise (Hawthorn) & Faculty of 
Higher Education (Lilydale), Swinburne University of Technology. 
1 See Parker v South Eastern Railway Co (1877) 2 CPD 416. 
2 [1956] 1 WLR 461. 
3 [1956] 1 WLR 461, 466. 
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In an article written some time ago, Elizabeth McDonald expressed the view 
that the red hand rule does not apply to signed documents, concluding as 
follows:  
 
[I]t must be remembered that the rule is not one saying that D cannot 
incorporate unreasonable clauses; it merely says that special notice will be 
required to make such a clause part of the contract ... So in the end the rule 
cannot prevent D having a very unusual or unreasonable clause in any 
contract he makes. D can always put the clause in a red box with a red hand 
pointing to it or even take the situation outside the rule by obtaining P’s 
signature. It follows that the rule does not actually require the redrafting of 
any standard form contracts provided D is prepared to give greater 
prominence to the appropriate clauses or obtain P’s signature. 4 
 
The aim of this article is to review the case law relating to the red hand rule, 
with a view to examining whether the rule applies to signed contracts. In 
particular, emphasis will be placed on the High Court’s recent decision in Toll 
(FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd 5 (hereinafter referred to as Toll). If the 
red hand rule does not apply to signed contracts, an issue that must then be 
considered is whether this creates a deficiency in the law that will need to be 
addressed by the legislature. 
 
In Toll the High Court had to consider whether exemption and indemnity 
clauses in a credit application, signed by an agent of the plaintiff, were 
binding. Although the High Court did not specifically refer to the red hand 
rule, what the court had to say in its unanimous judgment signals a clear 
answer to the question whether the red hand rule applies to signed documents.  
 
If the red hand rule has no application to signed documents, the flow on effect 
is that any attack on the use of unreasonable or unusual clauses in signed 
contracts will generally have to be based on section 52 of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth) and statutory provisions relating to unconscionability. This 
article will therefore include a discussion of two recent cases involving 
National Exchange Pty Ltd, a company controlled by the share trader David 
Tweed, where reliance was placed on these statutory provisions by the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC).  The first of these 
cases is significant because the Full Federal Court also made reference to the 
red hand rule. 
 
                                                 
4 Elizabeth McDonald, ‘The Duty to Give Notice of Unusual Contract Terms’ (1988) 
Journal of Business Law 375, 385. 
5 (2004) 211 ALR 342. 
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II THE RED HAND RULE 
 
In Spurling v Bradshaw,6 referred to above, the court did not need to consider 
the red hand rule in detail because of past dealings between the parties and 
the finding that the clause in question was not unreasonable. Greater attention 
was placed on the rule in Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd 7 where Lord 
Denning MR dealt with a clause exempting a car park proprietor from liability 
for personal injury. In the course of his judgment his Lordship said: 
 
I do not pause to enquire whether the exempting condition is void for 
unreasonableness. All I say is that it is so wide and so destructive of rights 
that the court should not hold any man bound by it unless it is drawn to his 
attention in the most explicit way. It is an instance of what I had in mind in J 
Spurling v. Bradshaw (1956) 1 WLR 461, 466.  In order to give sufficient 
notice, it would need to be printed in red ink with a red hand pointing to it, or 
something equally startling.8 
 
The English Court of Appeal undertook further consideration of the red hand 
rule in Interfoto Picture Library v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd.9 The facts 
of the Interfoto case are reasonably straightforward. The appellant was an 
advertising agency that required photographs for a presentation to a client. 
The respondent ran a transparency library. The appellant telephoned the 
respondent, with whom it had not previously dealt, and enquired whether it 
had any suitable photographs. The respondent forwarded 47 transparencies, 
packed in a bag, together with a delivery note.  
 
The delivery note specified the date of return as being fourteen days after the 
date of dispatch, which was marked as 5 March 1984. At the bottom of the 
note was a list of nine conditions, one of which (Condition 2) provided for the 
return of all transparencies within fourteen days, with a holding fee of ₤5 
payable per transparency for each late day, plus VAT.  The appellant put the 
transparencies aside and forgot to return them until 2 April. The respondent 
claimed the sum of ₤3783.50, in accordance with condition 2 of the delivery 
note, for retention of the transparencies from 19 March to 2 April. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 [1956] 1 WLR 461. 
7 (1971) 2 QB 163. 
8 (1971) 2 QB 163, 170. 
9 (1988) 1 All ER 348. See analysis in Steve Kapnoullas and Bruce Clarke, ‘Fine Print 
in Contracts: From “Invisible Ink” Cases to “Red Ink” Rules’ (1993) 19 Melbourne 
University Law Review 92. 
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In the lower court, evidence was given that most photographic libraries 
charged less than ₤3.50 per week for retention of transparencies. Surprisingly, 
it was not argued that condition 2 constituted a penalty.10  Rather, the focus 
was on whether it formed part of the contract between the parties. The trial 
judge found that it did and entered judgment for the respondent. His Honour’s 
decision on this point was reversed by the Court of Appeal. 
 
Although this was not a case involving exclusion clauses, their Lordships 
hearing the appeal drew heavily on case law in that area, particularly Parker v 
South Eastern Railway Company 11 and Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd.12 
As the delivery note was an unsigned document, the question arose as to 
whether reasonable notice had been given in relation to condition 2. 
 
In the Interfoto case, Bingham LJ followed on Lord Denning’s approach in 
Thornton’s case, holding that the appellant should have realised that the 
delivery note contained contractual conditions, but only those which one 
might usually or reasonably expect. The critical question was whether the 
respondent could be said fairly and reasonably to have brought condition 2 to 
the notice of the appellant. His Lordship concluded that the appellant was 
relieved of liability not because it had failed to read the conditions, but 
because the respondent did not do what was necessary to draw the 
unreasonable and extortionate clause to the appellant’s attention. Similarly, 
Dillon LJ said: 
 
It is, in my judgment, a logical development of the common law into modern 
conditions that it should be held, as it was in Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking 
Ltd, that, if one condition in a set of printed conditions is particularly 
onerous or unusual, the party seeking to enforce it must show that that 
particular condition was fairly brought to the attention of the other party.13 
 
The appellant’s appeal was accordingly allowed, although the appellant was 
ordered to pay ₤3.50 per week per transparency on a quantum meruit basis for 
retention of the transparencies beyond a reasonable period. 
 
                                                 
10 (1988) 1 All ER 348, 358 (Bingham L.J): ‘In reaching the conclusion I have 
expressed I would not wish to be taken as deciding that condition 2 was not 
challengeable as a disguised penalty clause. This point was not argued before the 
judge nor raised in the notice of appeal. It was accordingly not argued before us. I 
have accordingly felt bound to assume, somewhat reluctantly, that condition 2 would 
be enforceable if fully and fairly brought to the defendants’ attention.’ 
11 (1877) 2 CPD 416. 
12 (1971) 2 QB 163. 
13 (1988) 1 All ER 348, 358. 
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In Australia, in MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of 
State Taxation (WA),14 Jacobs J suggested that if an unreasonable clause is 
included in terms (in this case printed on an unsigned airline ticket) that are 
not read, and are not likely to be read, then there is no acceptance of that 
condition. Subsequently, in the High Court case of Oceanic Sun Line Special 
Shipping Company Inc v Fay,15 Brennan J, after referring to Thornton’s case, 
said ‘In differing circumstances, different steps may be needed to bring an 
exemption clause to a passenger’s notice, especially if the clause is an unusual 
one.’ 16  
 
However, it should be emphasised that earlier Brennan J also said: 
 
If a passenger signs and thereby binds himself to the terms of a contract of 
carriage containing a clause exempting the carrier from liability for loss 
arising out of the carriage, it is immaterial that the passenger did not trouble 
to discover the contents of the contract. 17  
 
It appears clear from the above that his Honour was drawing a distinction 
between signed and unsigned documents, and that the rules relating to 
reasonable notice, and the red hand rule, do not apply to signed documents. 
 
In Victoria, the red hand rule was considered by the Court of Appeal in Le 
Mans Grand Prix Circuits Pty Ltd v Iliadis18 (Le Mans). Iliadis attended a 
promotional function at the defendant’s go-kart track. He was asked to sign a 
form headed ‘TO HELP US WITH OUR ADVERTISING’. Iliadis gave 
evidence that he signed the form believing it allowed him to drive a faster 
vehicle, and that the defendant was using it for marketing purposes. The 
document contained an exemption clause relieving the defendant from 
liability for personal injury. Iliadis was injured owing to the defendant’s 
negligence and sued. 
 
The focus of the majority judgment, delivered by Tadgell JA (with whom 
Winneke P agreed), was on whether the document signed by the plaintiff was 
contractual, or alternatively if the parties were in a contractual relationship. In  
 
                                                 
14 (1975) 133 CLR 125, 142. 
15 (1988) 165 CLR 197. 
16 (1988) 165 CLR 197, 228. 
17 (1988) 165 CLR 197, 228. 
18 (1998) 4 VR 661. See a full analysis in Bruce Clarke and Steve Kapnoullas, ‘When 
is a Signed Document Contractual? – Taking the “Fun” out of the “Funfair”’ (2001) 
1(1) Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 39. 
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the course of argument, however, it appears that the defendant’s counsel 
conceded that contractual documents containing ‘an onerous exemptive 
provision must be brought to the notice of the party against whom they are 
enforced.’19 
 
Batt JA, in his dissenting judgement, was in no doubt that the rule in 
L’Estrange v Graucob20 applied to the facts of this case, and that knowledge 
of the contents of a document will be presumed where it is signed. It is only 
where a contractual document is not signed that a different rule applies, viz 
that the party relying on the document’s terms must establish reasonable or 
sufficient notice. In the judgment of Batt JA the Interfoto case did not apply 
because the document in that case was unsigned. Put simply, the requirement 
of reasonable notice, and therefore the red hand rule, does not apply to signed 
documents.21 
 
As noted in the introduction to this article, recently the red hand rule was 
briefly referred to by the Full Federal Court in National Exchange Pty Ltd v 
ASIC (National Exchange No 1).22  David Tweed, a share trader, through his 
company National Exchange Pty Ltd, specialises in making off-market offers 
to buy shares. He has estimated that he has made $10 million by buying 
shares below their stockmarket price.23 
 
In 2003 ASIC passed a requirement that off-market share offers must disclose 
the market price of the shares. National Exchange offered to buy shares 
valued at $1.93 for $2.00, which appeared to be seven cents above the market 
value. However, a clause in the fine print of the offer document provided for 
payment over fifteen annual instalments. One potential seller was nearly 
eighty years old, and it was doubtful therefore whether she would have lived 
long enough to receive payment in full. 
 
ASIC sought an order under section 1041 of the Corporations Act 2001. 
Section 1041 states:  
 
                                                 
19 (1998) 4 VR 661, 667. 
20 (1934) 2 KB 394. 
21 (1988) 4 VR 661, 673-674. His Honour said “Signature and reasonable notice are to 
a large extent counterparts in the respective cases of signed and unsigned documents: 
signing affords the person who signs the opportunity to become aware of the contents 
of the document.” 
22 (2004) FCAFC 90. 
23 Leonie Wood, ‘Share scammer rakes in $10m from four deals’ The Age 
(Melbourne) 7 December 2004. 
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A person must not engage in conduct, in relation to a financial product or a 
financial service, that is misleading or deceptive, or is likely to mislead or 
deceive.  
 
This section is virtually identical to section 52 of the Trade Practices Act.  
 
In the course of their judgments, their Honours Jacobson and Bennett JJ, 
immediately before referring to Spurling v Bradshaw, said:  
 
The representation made in the table is that the shareholders will receive in 
cash in full on acceptance a premium of 7 cents over the closing price. The 
true position is that accepting shareholders make an interest free loan of the 
purchase price to the appellant over a period of 15 years. To describe it as a 
cheeky offer would be to understate the full import of the document. 
Where the disparity between the primary statement and the true position is 
great it is necessary for the maker of the statement to draw the attention of 
the reader to the true position in the clearest possible way. 24 
 
Although it has to be said that the Full Federal Court was more concerned 
with determining whether the offer document itself was misleading,25 this 
dictum, and more particularly the decision in Le Mans, constitute the little 
case law in Australia that suggests the red hand rule may have application to 
signed documents. This meant there was a degree of uncertainty in the law, to 
the extent that it required the attention of the High Court in Toll. 
 
III TOLL 
 
 A The Facts of Toll 
 
The facts of Toll are complicated, but it is only necessary to refer to those 
facts relevant to the essential issue raised by this article. Richard Thomson Pty 
Ltd (Thomson), acting as agent26 for Alphapharm, arranged for Toll (formerly 
known as Finemores) to transport a large quantity of flu vaccine. The vaccine 
was stored and transported by Toll at below the suggested temperature, 
damaging the vaccine and resulting in a loss of $683,061. 
 
                                                 
24 (2004) FCAFC 90, [54]-[55]. 
25 The offer document was accompanied with a standard share transfer form, which 
had to be signed and returned by shareholders wishing to accept the offer. 
26 One of the issues the court had to decide in this case was whether Thomson had 
acted as agent for Alphapharm. This aspect of the case is not important to the issue 
raised by this article. However, the High Court did find that Thomson, through its 
representative Mr. Gardiner-Garden, did have authority to bind Alphapharm. 
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The carrier, Toll, claimed that it was not liable because the agreement 
between the parties included a clause (condition 6) exempting it from liability 
for ‘theft, misdelivery, delay in delivery, loss, damage or destruction, by any 
cause whatsoever’ including breach of contract or negligence. Another clause 
(condition 8) contained an indemnity from Thomson, in favour of Toll, in 
relation to any claim made by Associates of Thomson. ‘Associates’ was 
defined to mean: 
 
(i) the owner, sender or receiver of the goods; 
(ii) a person having an interest in the goods; 
(iii) the Customer’s principal; and 
(iv) any agent, representative, employee or sub-contractor of the Customer 
or those persons. 
 
The clauses in question were printed on the back of a document signed by 
Thomson’s representative, Mr. Gardiner-Garden. The document was headed 
‘Application for Credit’. Prior to signing the credit application, Thomson had 
received a quote by facsimile, which included the following statement: 
 
[I]t would be very much appreciated if you would complete the Credit 
Application and sign the Freight Rate Schedule accepting our Rates and 
Conditions and fax back to our office at your earliest convenience. 
 
On behalf of Thomson, Mr. Gardiner-Garden subsequently signed the 
Application for Credit. Immediately above the place where he signed 
appeared the words ‘Please read ‘conditions of contract (overleaf) prior to 
signing’. 
 
Mr. Gardiner-Garden gave evidence that he did not read the conditions of 
contract. There was no suggestion of misrepresentation, nor was there 
anything to prevent Mr. Gardiner-Garden from reading the document. The 
type of exemption and indemnity clauses included in the document were 
commonly used in the refrigerated transport industry. However, Mr. Gardiner-
Garden gave evidence that he would not have signed the Application for 
Credit had he been aware of the clauses in question. 
 
The claim for damages against Toll was primarily based on an allegation of 
negligence (as a bailee), although a claim was also brought under section 52 
of the Trade Practices Act. 
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 B Toll in the Lower Courts 
 
The trial judge, in the District Court of New South Wales, was of the view 
that to determine the outcome of this dispute the correct test to apply was 
whether the defendant gave reasonable notice of the ‘Conditions of Contract’. 
The trial judge said: 
 
Mr Garden had already read a document containing rates and conditions. He 
was then presented with another document which on its face related to 
matters relevant to his company’s creditworthiness. All that was done to give 
him notice was the single sentence above the space provided for his 
signature which read “Please read ‘conditions of contract’ (overleaf) prior to 
signing.” Had he noticed that sentence, he would have been quite justified in 
assuming that overleaf there were conditions relating to the terms upon 
which credit would be extended to his company. Conditions about cartage 
and storage had been set out in the previous document. There was nothing in 
the Application for Credit document itself, in the surrounding circumstances 
or in anything that Finemores [Toll] had said or done that should have 
alerted him to the fact that the document contained conditions which so 
radically affected the contract.27  
 
All three judges of the New South Wales Court of Appeal28 (Sheller JA, 
Young CJ in Eq and Bryson J.) agreed that the critical question was that of 
reasonable notice.  Although no specific reference was made to the red hand 
rule, all judges concluded that reasonable notice had not been given, because 
the clauses appeared in a document headed ‘Application for Credit’, where 
one would not expect to find such conditions.  Their Honours rejected the 
argument by counsel for Toll that there was no authority requiring reasonable 
notice where a contract has been signed, even where the contract contains 
terms extraneous to the subject matter of the document signed.   
 
Young CJ in Eq, although briefly noting some academic disquiet about 
L’Estrange v Graucob, stated that ‘it is a very useful principle properly 
understood and should continue to be applied.’29  However, his Honour went 
on to find that reasonable notice had not been given of the clauses in question.  
 
Bryson J also reached the same conclusion, but his Honour’s reasoning was 
slightly different. Signature is usually a very strong indication of an intention  
 
 
                                                 
27 See (2004) 211 ALR 342 [58] (emphasis added). 
28 (2003) NSWCA 75. 
29 (2003) NSWCA 75, [69]. 
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to be bound, but does not exclude consideration of ‘facts and circumstances 
which may show it was not.’30  His Honour concluded: 
 
The conditions, particularly Condition 8, are in no way what one would 
reasonably expect or suppose would be found incorporated in an Application 
for Credit…[A]ny reasonable person would be astonished to find that he was 
asked, as a condition of being given 14 days’ credit, to indemnify his 
supplier from claims arising out of the transaction; unless it was pointed out 
to him he would never think it might be there. 31 
 
Commenting on this case in a recent text on contract law32 the authors 
conclude: 
 
The decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal does not sit 
comfortably with the rule in L’Estrange v Graucob as it is traditionally 
applied, that if a document is contractual in nature, the signer will be bound 
by its terms. 33 
 
After acknowledging that Mr. Gardiner-Garden would have no reason to 
expect the Application for Credit to contain terms relevant to the transport 
contract the authors continue: 
 
Further modification of the rule in L’Estrange v Graucob may well be 
justified so that a person is not bound by terms that he or she would not 
normally expect to find in a contract of that kind simply because it has been 
signed. 34 
 
This appears to be an indirect acceptance that a party should not be bound by 
unreasonable or unusual terms even if a contract has been signed; in other 
words, an acknowledgment that the red hand rule can have application to 
signed contracts.35 The above statement was made before the High Court 
delivered its judgment in Toll, which it is now appropriate to examine. Would 
the High Court be prepared to accept further exceptions to L’Estrange v 
Graucob? 
 
                                                 
30 (2003) NSWCA 75, [105]. 
31 (2003) NSWCA 7 [138]. 
32 Lindy Wilmott, Sharon Christensen and Des Butler, Contract Law (2nd ed, 2005). 
33 Ibid 224. 
34 Ibid. 
35 The authors also state that, ‘the general rule in L’Estrange v Graucob would 
continue to apply, but additional steps must be taken by a person seeking to rely on 
the term or terms if they would not ordinarily be found in a contract of that type.’  
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 C Toll in the High Court 
 
In the High Court’s unanimous judgment in favour of Toll, the rule in 
L’Estrange v Graucob was strictly applied. The Court referred to Wilton v 
Farnworth,36 where Latham C.J emphasised that any weakening of the 
principles relating to the binding effect of signature would lead to chaos in 
every day business transactions.37  
 
The High Court further observed that legal instruments of various kinds take 
their efficacy from signature or execution, and that people who have not read 
and understood all their terms often sign such instruments.  Such people are 
nevertheless committed to those terms by the act of signature or execution. It 
is that commitment which enables third parties to assume the legal efficacy of 
the instrument. ‘To undermine that assumption would cause serious 
mischief.’38 
 
In reaching their decision in Toll, the judges in the courts below failed to 
adequately distinguish between signed and unsigned documents. The High 
Court referred to the judgments of Mellish LJ in Parker v South Eastern 
Railway Company39 and Brennan J in Oceanic Sun Ltd v Fay,40 judgments 
which drew a clear distinction between signed and unsigned documents. The 
High Court emphasised that:  
 
The general rule, which applies in the present case, is that where there is no 
suggested vitiating element, and no claim for equitable or statutory relief, a 
person who signs a document which is known by that person to contain 
contractual terms, and to affect legal relations, is bound by those terms, and 
it is immaterial that the person has not read the document. L’ Estrange v 
Graucob explicitly rejected an attempt to import the principles relating to 
ticket cases into the area of signed contracts. 41 
 
The document that Mr. Gardiner-Garden signed in Toll was clearly 
contractual and intended to affect the legal relations between the parties. The 
court distinguished some of the case law relied on by the plaintiff in the court 
below, where signature was obtained on non-contractual documents. 
 
 
                                                 
36 (1975) 132 CLR 646, 649. 
37 (2004) 211 ALR 342, [45]. 
38 (2004) 211 ALR 342, [47]. 
39 (1877) 2 CPD 416. 
40 (1988) 165 CLR 197. 
41 (2004) 211 ALR 342, [57]. 
DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 11 NO 2 106 
 
The High Court was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the parties in Toll 
operated in a commercial context. In addition, Alphapharm had insurance 
covering the damage to the vaccine.  There was no suggestion of 
misrepresentation and Mr. Gardiner-Garden had every opportunity to read the 
document, but did not take the trouble to do so. The court was unimpressed by 
Mr. Gardiner-Garden’s assertion, in evidence, that he would not have signed 
the Application for Credit had he known that it contained exemption and 
indemnity clauses.42 The court made it clear, that in cases such as this, the 
objective approach is adopted to determine the intention of the parties.43  
 
Le Mans, previously referred to in this article, was distinguished by the High 
Court on the basis of the defendant’s somewhat surprising concession in that 
case that reasonable steps must be taken to bring onerous provisions in a 
contractual document to the notice of the party against whom they are to be 
enforced.44 The court nevertheless seemed to suggest that the outcome of Le 
Mans could be supported on the basis of a misrepresentation as to the nature 
of the document signed. 
 
Intriguingly, the High Court, whilst affirming that the exceptions to 
L’Estrange v Graucob are to be kept within narrow parameters,45 went on to 
say: 
 
There are circumstances in which it is material to ask whether a person who 
has signed a document was given reasonable notice of what was in it. Cases 
where misrepresentation is alleged, or where mistake is claimed, provide 
examples. No one suggests that the fact that a document has been signed is 
for all purposes conclusive as to its legal effect. 46 
 
Further on in its judgment the court also remarked that there ‘may be cases 
where the circumstances in which a document is presented for signature, or 
the presence in it of unusual terms, could involve misrepresentation.’ 47 
                                                 
42 (2004) 211 ALR 342, [35]. 
43 The issue as to what extrinsic evidence is available in such situations is explored 
elsewhere: see Elisabeth Peden and John W Carter, ‘Incorporation of Terms by 
Signature: L’Estrange Rules!’ (2005) 21 Journal of Contract Law 96. 
44 (2004) 211 ALR 342, [66]. 
45 See reference to Petelin v Cullen (1975) 132 CLR 355 at (2004) 211 ALR 342, 
[46]. 
46 (2004) 211 ALR 342, [54]. 
47 (2004) 211 ALR 342, [63]. The court continued by saying, ‘There could also be 
circumstances in which one party would not reasonably understand another party’s 
signature to a document as a manifestation of intent to enter into legal relations, or of 
assent to its terms.’ 
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This dictum is equivocal, and with respect, somewhat confusing. As Peden 
and Carter argue, ‘there has never been any requirement of reasonableness 
when holding another bound to a signed contract.’48 
 
The High Court gives little guidance as to what might constitute unusual 
terms. One can only speculate what their Honour’s had in mind. For example, 
in National Exchange No 1, previously referred to, assume a shareholder was 
to sign the offer document forwarded to him or her. It will be re-called that the 
document contained an unusual, and arguably unreasonable, clause providing 
for payment over fifteen years. Is this the type of circumstance the High Court 
had in mind? 
 
 D Analysis 
 
It should be emphasised that in Toll there was no direct reference to the red 
hand rule.  Nevertheless, the core of the plaintiff’s argument was that one 
would not expect to find exclusionary or indemnity clauses in an Application 
for Credit. As the High Court observed: 
 
It appears from the reasoning of the primary judge and the Court of Appeal 
that the proposition [requiring reasonable notice] was given narrower focus, 
and was limited to exclusion clauses, or, perhaps, exclusion clauses which 
are regarded by a court as unusual and onerous. 49  
 
By rejecting this argument the judgment of the High Court therefore supports 
the view expressed by McDonald, referred to in the introduction to this article, 
that the red hand rule does not apply to signed documents.   
 
The High Court considered that the exclusion and indemnity clauses in the 
document signed by Mr Gardiner-Garden on behalf of Thomson were 
commonly employed in the refrigerated transport industry. With respect, even 
if the court’s conclusion on this point is accepted, it could just as easily be 
argued that Thomson would have no reason to expect terms relevant to a 
transport contract in an Application for Credit.50 To put it another way, the  
 
                                                 
48 See Peden and Carter, above n 43, 102. 
49 [2004] 211 ALR 342, [54] (emphasis added). 
50 See Wilmott, Christensen and Butler, above n 32, 224.  See also Peden and Carter, 
above n 43, who state at 104: ‘Although it was clearly appropriate for Alphapharm 
(acting through Richard Thomson) to assume that there were additional terms in the 
Application, it would not have been unreasonable to assume that these related to the 
terms of credit, not to exclusion of liability.’ 
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‘expectations of honest businessmen’, to coin a phrase used by Lord Justice 
Steyn,51 would be that a credit contract would normally contain terms relevant 
to that type of contract, and not terms which were completely alien in nature. 
In the same context, we believe that the High Court’s criticism of Le Mans is 
not warranted, as a reasonable person would not expect to find exclusionary 
provisions in a document headed ‘TO HELP US WITH OUR 
ADVERTISING’. 
 
Another aspect deserving comment is the High Court’s emphasis on the 
commercial nature of the transaction. The court noted that: 
 
Each of the … parties to the case is a substantial commercial organisation, 
capable of looking after its own interests.  This hardly seems an auspicious 
setting for an argument that a party who signs a contractual document is not 
bound by its terms because its representative did not read the document.52 
 
Together with its decision in ACCC v Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd53 and more 
recently in Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty54, the High Court is showing a 
concern for upholding commercial contracts. As Peden and Carter conclude, 
‘the decision illustrates that when not distracted by equity the High Court will 
adopt a ‘hands off’ approach to commercial contracts under which orthodoxy 
rules.’55  
 
 
 
                                                 
51 Lord Johan Steyn, ‘Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest 
Men’ (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 433.  
52 (2004) 211 ALR 342, [29]. 
53 (2003) 197 ALR 153.  At 157 Gleeson C J said ‘In the present case, there was 
neither a special disadvantage on the part of the lessees, nor unconscientious conduct 
on the part of the lessors.  All the people involved in the transaction were business 
people, concerned to advance or protect their own interest.’  See the discussion by 
Rick Bigwood, ‘Curbing Unconscionability: Berbatis in the High Court of Australia’ 
(2004) 28 Melbourne University .Law Review 203 and Liam Brown, ‘The Impact of 
Section 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) on Commercial Certainty’ 
(2004) 28 Melbourne University Law Review 589. 
54 (2004) ALJR 308. Analysed by Dr Warren Pengilley, ‘Misleading or deceptive 
conduct considered by the High Court. Does Butcher’s case indicate a new judicial 
conservatism?’ (2005) 12 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 314. 
55 See Peden and Carter, above n 43, at 105. See also Peter Lovell and John Nunns, 
‘Business to Business Contracts in the High Court: A “Hands Off” 
Approach?’Conference Papers, Television Education Network (Melbourne - August 
2005). 
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In refusing to create further exceptions to L’Estrange v Graucob, the High 
Court made the observation that consumers, in particular, were sufficiently 
protected by statutory provisions designed to ameliorate the strictness of the 
rule. This observation requires further consideration.   
 
IV THE IMPACT OF STATUTORY LAW ON THE RULE IN 
L’ESTRANGE V GRAUCOB56 
 
The extent to which s 52 of the Trade Practices Act can be utilised in cases 
involving signed contracts was not reviewed by the High Court in Toll. The 
plaintiff in Toll did initially allege that the conduct of the defendant was 
misleading and deceptive in breach of s 52, but the trial judge dismissed the 
allegation, and no appeal against that decision was made. Whilst the High 
Court in Toll acknowledged that statutory relief sometimes ameliorates the 
hardship caused by the strict application of legal principle to contractual 
relations, it put the availability of such relief into context by observing ‘there 
is no reason to depart from principle, and every reason to adhere to it, in cases 
where such legislation does not apply, or is not invoked.’57  
 
Section 52 has been successfully utilised in relation to commercial contracts 
that contained provisions that contradicted verbal representations made by 
defendants.58 The statutory remedy is independent of the contract. But it must 
be remembered that a claim under s 52 rests on establishing misleading or 
deceptive conduct. In Toll there was no evidence that the plaintiff was tricked 
or misled into signing the Application for Credit, so consequently, as 
previously mentioned, the trial judge dismissed the claim based on s 52. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 It should not be forgotten that other provisions in the Trade Practices Act limit the 
use of exclusion clauses in consumer type contracts. Furthermore, the Contracts 
Review Act 1980 (NSW) may also operate to protect consumers. The recent 
introduction of Part 2B – ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ (ss 32U – 32ZD) 
into the Victorian Fair Trading Act 1999 is also designed to strengthen the rights of 
consumers with regard to unfair contracts: see James Catlin, ‘Consumers benefit from 
transparency’ (2004) (Feb – March) Law Institute Journal 54.  Finally, reference 
should be made to section 37 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), which deals 
with notification of unusual terms in contracts of insurance. This is, in effect, a 
statutory recognition of the red hand rule in the area of insurance.  
57 [2004] 211 ALR 342, [48] (High Court of Australia 2004). 
58 See for example Dibble v Aidan Nominees Pty Ltd (1986) ATPR 40-693 and Lezam 
Pty Ltd v Seabridge Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 107 ALR 291. 
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The intrusion of s 52 into the field of contract law has been subject to 
criticism,59 but as National Exchange No 1 shows, there is scope to apply the 
section in limited circumstances. In National Exchange No 1, as observed 
earlier in this article, the court relied on a provision in the Corporations Act 
that is the statutory equivalent to s 52 of the Trade Practices Act.  
 
It will be recalled that in National Exchange No 1 the share offer document 
contained an unusual, and arguably unreasonable, clause providing for 
payment of the consideration over 15 years. The Full Federal Court found that 
the document was misleading or deceptive, even though it contained nothing 
that was literally false. Insufficient prominence had been given to the terms of 
payment in the offer document, leaving some shareholders, especially those 
who were less than careful readers, with a misleading impression as to the 
cash amount they were to receive upon acceptance. When seeking leave to 
appeal to the High Court, National Exchange argued that it should not be 
liable for misleading or deceptive conduct if the shareholders were misled 
only because they failed to read the document given to them, when the 
document was expressed in relatively clear and unambiguous terms. The High 
Court rejected the submission and refused special leave to appeal from that 
decision.60 
 
By way of contrast, more recently in ASIC v National Exchange Pty Ltd 61 
(National Exchange No 2) the Full Federal Court has held that a statutory 
equivalent to s 52 was not infringed. The facts can be summarised briefly. 
National Exchange made an off-market offer to members of Aevum, a 
demutualised company. The offer was to buy at 35 cents a share. The offer 
document contained a statement advising that National Exchange considered a 
fair value of each share to be in the range of $0.90 to $1.29. Notwithstanding 
this, National Exchange’s offer to purchase at $0.35 was accepted by 257 
shareholders. When the shares were listed for trading they opened at $1.54 per 
share, which was 4.4 times the price offered by National Exchange. 
 
                                                 
59 Diane Skapinker and John W Carter, ‘Breach of Contract and Misleading Conduct 
in Australia’ (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 294. But see the retort by Jason 
Cornwall-Jones, ‘Breach of Contract and Misleading Conduct: A Storm in the 
Teacup?’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 249 and also Dr Vivien 
Goldwasser and Tony Ciro, ‘Standards of Behaviour in Commercial Contracting’ 
(2002) 30 Australian Business Law .Review 369 and Russell Miller, ‘From acorn to 
oak tree: The spreading branches of s 52 of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974’ 
(2005) 79 Australian Law Journal 4.  
60 National Exchange Pty Ltd v ASIC [2004] HCATrans 557. 
61 [2005] FCAFC 226. 
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The main issue in the case was whether National Exchange had engaged in 
misleading conduct, or alternatively unconscionable conduct, pursuant to 
statute law. As to the first ground the Full Court held that the clear language 
of the offer document meant that there was no misrepresentation or deception. 
This was in spite of the fact that the document was cast in such a way that the 
critical information as to the fair estimate of the value of the shares was not 
contained on the front page in close proximity to the consideration for the 
offer - it was on the reverse page - and nor was it linked to the consideration. 
The court concluded that the document did not exhort or advise offerees to 
accept the offer, or represent that the price was fair. Rather, it urged 
shareholders to obtain their own share valuation and to read the entire 
document. The document was a short one and was not in legalistic terms. 
National Exchange clearly stated its estimate of a fair value range for the 
shares.  
 
It is difficult to reconcile the decision of the Full Federal Court with regard to 
s 52 in this case with the decision reached in National Exchange No 1. To 
provide for payment over 15 years was held to be misleading in National 
Exchange No 1, whereas an offer to buy shares at a gross undervalue in 
National Exchange No 2 was not; even though a fair estimate of their value 
was tucked away on the back of the offer document. 
 
It should be noted, however, that the court did conclude that National 
Exchange, by targeting vulnerable shareholders ‘ripe for exploitation’, had 
engaged in unconscionable conduct under s 12CB (and 12CC) of the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth), which 
broadly equates with s 51AB (and s 51AC) of the Trade Practices Act. 
Section 12CB is concerned with unconscionable conduct in relation to the 
supply of services to consumers. However, the court went on to hold, inter 
alia, that the acceptance of a share offer ‘cannot be said’ to be a financial 
service ‘of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household 
use’, and therefore fell outside the parameters of s 12CB.62  This finding was  
 
                                                 
62 [2005] FCAFC 226, [49]. 
Note: Section 12CC did not apply in this case because it is designed to protect small 
businesses, as is s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act. In reaching its decision in this 
case the court referred to an article by Gail Pearson, ‘The ambit of unconscionable 
conduct in relation to financial services’ (2005) 23 Company and Securities Law 
Journal 105. 
Note also: The court concluded that National Exchange had failed to comply with the 
provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) requiring its offer to be held open for 
one month – offerees in this case had to accept in 7 days. 
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reached with little analysis of the issue. In this day and age, when ‘Mum and 
Dad’ investors are commonly managing their own share portfolios, it is the 
view of the authors that this matter deserved more careful consideration.63 
 
As a result of this decision the legislature may need to consider amending s 
51AB of the Trade Practices Act (and similar statutory provisions in other 
pieces of legislation) to broaden the definition of ‘consumer’. One possibility 
is to adopt the method used in s 4B of the Act, where transactions, unless 
specifically excluded, are deemed to be ‘consumer’ transactions if the price of 
the goods or services does not exceed a prescribed amount (presently 
$40,000).64 
 
In summary, Toll has shown that there is little scope to apply the red hand 
rule to signed documents. However, the two National Exchange cases also 
show that s 52 of the Trade Practices Act, and statutory provisions relating to 
unconscionability, are sometimes available to ‘consumers’ where 
unreasonable, unusual or onerous clauses are incorporated into a contract. 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
The signed document rule laid down by L’Estrange v Graucob has been 
subject to criticism. Lord Denning, who successfully argued for the defendant 
in L’ Estrange v Graucob, went on to say subsequently that this case, together 
with Thompson v London, Midland and Scottish Railway Co,65 represented a 
‘bleak winter’ for the law of contract.66 Ironically, Stephen Gageler SC, who 
appeared for the defendant in Toll, in a joint article written with Sir Anthony 
Mason some years earlier, made reference to the principle laid down by 
L’Estrange v Graucob and noted ‘that the requirements of fairness and justice 
may call for its re-examination.’67 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 See Bruce Clarke and Steve Kapnoullas, ‘The Definition of ‘Consumer’ in the 
Trade Practices Act: A Guide for the Perplexed’(1993) 1 Current Contract Law 10  
64 If the price exceeds the prescribed amount, the transaction will still be a ‘consumer’ 
transaction if the goods or services are of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, 
domestic or household use or consumption. 
65 (1930) 1 KB 41. 
66 In George Mitchell (Chesterhall) v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd (1983) 1 QB 284, 296 . 
67 Sir Anthony Mason and Stephen J Gageler, ‘The Contract’ in PD Finn (ed), Essays 
in Contract (3rd ed, 1987) 12.  
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Similarly, one American author, M I Meyerson,68 has remarked: 
 
Courts moralistically preached that if a person failed to read the contract ‘he 
cannot set up his own carelessness and indolence as a defense…’ [T]his 
classical theory has no basis in either reality or justice.69 
 
Some United States courts have developed a doctrine of unfair surprise to 
counter the use of unreasonable and unusual clauses ‘hidden in a maze of fine 
print’.70 However, in Toll the High Court considered the distinction between 
signed and unsigned documents to be critical in the context of incorporation.71 
So far as the red hand rule is concerned it appears to be clear that there is 
little room to argue that it applies to signed contracts. The High Court in Toll 
has signalled that, apart from statute law, the exceptions to L’Estrange v 
Graucob are to be narrowly confined to areas such as misrepresentation, 
mistake, non est factum and unconscionability.   
 
In refusing to create further exceptions to L’Estrange v Graucob, the High 
Court observed that consumers, in particular, are sufficiently protected by 
statutory provisions designed to ameliorate the strictness of the rule. This is 
debatable, given the recent decision in National Exchange No 2. We would 
suggest that there is a need for the legislature to step in and strengthen the 
protection offered by statutory regimes. The decisions in Toll and National 
Exchange No 2 leave the ‘consumer’ inadequately protected against those 
who would wish to take advantage of the credulity of some consumers faced 
with a decision that involves reading and signing a contractual document. The 
fact that David Tweed, through his company National Exchange, has made an 
estimated $10 million from offers to buy shares well below their stockmarket 
price provides ample evidence that many consumers do not take the trouble to 
read the fine print in contracts before signing them.  
                                                 
68 Michael I Meyerson, ‘The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of 
Consumer Form Contracts’ (1993) 47 University of Miami Law Review 1263, 1273. 
69 See also Robert A Hillman and Jeffrey J Rachlinski, ‘Standard From Contracting in 
the Electronic Age’ (2002) 77 New York University Law Review 429, who argue that 
many consumers are not likely to take the trouble to read terms and conditions 
contained in contracts entered into on the Internet. See also the criticism by John  R 
Spencer, ‘Signature, Consent, and the Rule in L’ Estrange v Graucob’ (1973) 32(1) 
Cambridge Law Journal 104.  
70 See Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture 350 FR 2d 445 (1965) referred to by 
Richard J Hunter Jnr, ‘Unconscionability Revisited: A Comparative Approach’ 
(1992) North Dakota Law Review 144. 
71 (2004) 211 ALR 342, [54].The court said ‘When an attempt is made to introduce 
the concept of sufficient notice into the field of signed contracts, there is a danger of 
subverting fundamental principle based on sound legal policy.’ 
